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In recent years, the use of the non-hypothetical 
experimental auctions, where the participants make 
consequential bids with real products and real money, 
has become very popular in assessing the consumers’ 
preferences for product attributes or new products. 
Lusk and Shogren (2007) indicated that up until 2006, 
more than 100 academic studies have utilized experi-
mental auctions to elicit the consumers’ preferences 
for various products. Numerous other studies have 
also used the experimental auctions since 20061. One 
of the major reasons2 for the increasing popularity of 
experimental auctions is their theoretical economic 
incentive compatibility property meaning that each 
bidder in the auction has the dominant strategy to 
submit bids equal to their true value for the good. 
Then, to get true valuations from experimental auc-
tions, the participants should be explicitly told about 
their weakly dominant strategy and provide with 
reasoning as to why they should follow it when bid-
ding (Lusk and Shrogren 2007). In other words, if the 
participants before the implementation of the auction 
are instructed that it is in their best interest to offer 
a bid equal to their true values, the participants will 
provide truthful biddings (as proved by Corrigan 
and Rousu 2008). However, it is possible that the 
participants might derive utility from winning the 
auction because of their degree of competitiveness 
(Corrigan and Rousu 2006, Lusk and Shrogren 2007). 
Then, it would be possible that the participants in 
the auction bid higher than their true willingness to 
pay (WTP) for the product because they want to win 
the product. This higher bidding could happen even 
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after the participants are instructed that their best 
strategy is to bid their true WTP. 
The objective in this paper is to assess the effect 
of the participants’ degree of competitiveness on 
their bids for food products in a non-hypothetical 
experimental auction. 
In other words, we test if there is a statistically sig-
nificant difference between the bids elicited by the par-
ticipants with two different levels of competitiveness 
(higher competitiveness and lower competitiveness).
To do that, we conducted an experimental auction 
with two treatments. In both treatments, the par-
ticipants, before the implementation of the auction, 
were asked about their level of competitiveness but 
in the second treatment, those participants with the 
highest levels of competitiveness were not allowed to 
participate in the auction. This manipulation aimed to 
diminish, ceteris paribus, the level of the participants’ 
competitiveness including only those participants who 
stated a lower level of competitiveness. Then, we will 
be able to test our hypothesis by directly comparing 
the elicited bids from the two treatments. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: the 
next section discusses the experimental design; the 
section following this presents the results and the 
final section provides some concluding remarks. 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
General design and hypothesis testing
To reach our aim, we conducted an experimental 
auction for four lamb meat products with two treat-
ments. We designed the two treatments as homog-
enous as possible with the only difference that in the 
second treatment, after asking the participants about 
their level of competitiveness, those who reported 
the highest levels were not allowed to participate in 
the auction. We kept the rest of design character-
istics similar between the treatments including the 
recruitment of subjects. Moreover, to set the level 
of competition among the participants to buy the 
auctioned product similar between treatments, the 
number of participants per session in both treatments 
was kept the same (11 participants).
As lies can affect behaviour in experiments (Alfnes 
and Rickersten, 2011), we did not deceive the partici-
pants because we provided true information about 
the auctioned products and we used real products, 
in other words, the products auctioned during the 
experiment possessed the characteristics explained to 
the participants. The experiments were conducted in 
the region of Aragón (Spain), in the town of Zaragoza 
and all participants were consumers, instead of stu-
dents, and claimed to eat lamb meat at least occa-
sionally to ensure that the participants were familiar 
with the auctioned product as suggested by Alfnes 
and Rickersten (2011). Each participant attended 
only one of the two treatments, in other words, we 
designed a between-subject experiment following 
several papers on experimental auctions (Lecocq et 
al. 2005; Rousu et al. 2007). 
To test if the participants’ level of competitiveness 
does affect their bidding behaviour, our hypothesis of 
interest is whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between the bids elicited from treatment 
1 (control treatment C) and treatment 2 (lower com-
petitiveness treatment, LC), where the most competi-
tive subjects were not allowed to participate in the 
auction, depicted as:
 H0: BidsC = BidsLC      H1: BidsC ≠ BidsLC (1)
If this hypothesis is not rejected, then we may con-
clude that the Bids from both treatments are statisti-
cally equal and therefore, the level of the participants’ 
competitiveness does not affect the participants bid-
ding behaviour in the auction. Therefore, the partici-
pants’ valuation for food products in experimental 
auctions is independent on the level of the participants’ 
competitiveness. 
Experimental auction design
We used a simultaneous (i.e., full bidding) experi-
mental auction3 for four locally produced lamb meats4 
3Alfnes (2009) indicated that the simultaneous auction approach seems to be the best choice when valuing products’ 
quality attributes.
4We auctioned four packages of three lamb ribs: (i) unlabeled non-suckling lamb meat; (ii) unlabeled suckling lamb 
meat; (iii) labeled non-suckling lamb meat; and (iv) labelled suckling lamb meat. Lamb ribs were chosen because they 
are well-known and appreciated cuts in the Zaragoza market. The label was a sheep breed locally produced called 
“Ojinegra from Teruel”. 
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and asked the subjects to simultaneously submit bids 
for each of the products. To avoid the demand reduc-
tion effects, the participants were told that they could 
only purchase one package of lamb meat. Therefore, a 
product was randomly drawn as the binding product 
at the end of the auction. 
Among the different incentive compatible auction 
mechanisms, we used a 4th price auction because it 
provides more winners than a typical Vickrey second-
price auction. The second-price auction method will 
only produce one winner per session and this situation 
could disengage some of the participants (e.g., off-
margin bidders).5 Moreover, several papers in the past 
have also utilized the 4th price auction (e.g., Alfnes et 
al. 2008; Shaw et al. 2006; Muller and Ruffieux 2011). 
We conducted five rounds in each session and the 
price and identification number of the four highest 
bidders for each product was written on a whiteboard 
after each round6. At the end of the session, one of the 
rounds was randomly selected as the binding round. 
Description of the auction implementation
After the arrival of the participants, they were in-
formed that they would receive 10 € participation fee 
at the end of the session. After the subjects consented 
to participate in the auction, they were assigned an 
ID number and were asked to complete a survey 
requesting information on the socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics as well as a question to 
measure the participants’ level of competitiveness. 
We used a question commonly used in the psychology 
and marketing literature to assess the competitiveness 
of individuals. In particular, we used a question with 
the following four items developed by Helmreich and 
Spence (1978) and applied by Brown and Peterson 
(1994), Brown et al. (1998) and Mowen (2004): (i) I 
enjoy competition more than others; (ii) I feel that it 
is important to outperform others; (iii) I enjoy testing 
my abilities against others; (iv) I feel that winning is 
extremely important. The respondents were asked 
to give their degree of agreement with these four 
sentences in a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 indicates 
strong disagreement and 5 indicates strong agreement. 
After the completion of the questionnaire, the monitor, 
in the second treatment, checked the competitive-
ness question and around four participants with the 
highest levels of competitiveness were not allowed to 
participate in the experiment7. They received the 10 € 
participation fees and thanks for their participation. 
Then, all the participants remaining in the sessions 
received the experimental instructions together with 
the product information. The monitor read the in-
structions aloud emphasizing that their dominant 
strategy is to reveal their true values and that one 
round and one product will be randomly drawn as 
binding. They were also asked not to communicate 
with any other participant for any reason, because 
any attempt to communicate with each other would 
lead to the failure of the experiment. Moreover, the 
monitor encouraged the participants to ask questions 
about the auction procedure if they have any doubts. 
We ran a practice auction using four different candy 
bars to fully familiarize the participants with the 
auction mechanism and to instruct them that it is in 
their best interest to bid their true values. After the 
practice auction with the candy bars, we conducted 
the lamb meat auction. First, the monitor passed the 
packages of lamb ribs to be auctioned around, so that 
each participant could inspect the products. Then, 
the lamb auction was conducted in several steps: 
5Lusk et al. (2007) found that if the number of participants who could purchase the product is approximately half the 
session size (N) (i.e., either a fourth of fifth price for commonly used session sizes), that this auction mechanism would 
generally be more effective in engaging all bidders (low, medium and high value bidders).
6The use of multiple rounds with price feedback (posted prices) was first applied in experimental auctions because as 
Plott (1996) suggested, people’s preferences are learned through experience and market exposure. Hence, price feed-
back in multiple rounds was used as a mechanism for subjects to learn the auction market. However, some researchers 
have cautioned that repeated exposure of subjects to market price might cause their bids to become affiliated, which 
could cause the incentive compatibility property of the auction mechanism to break down (Milgrom and Weber 1982; 
Harrison et al. 2004, 2006; Corrigan and Rousu 2006) and were in favor of one-shot institutions. On the other hand, 
there is another group of researchers who is supportive of the use of multiple rounds, arguing that this procedure yields 
valuations more consistent with neoclassical economic theory (Cox and Grether 1996; Shogren et al. 2001; Alfnes 
and Rickersen 2003; Shogren 2006; Lusk and Shogren 2007). Given that this issue is still unsettled in the literature, 
we opted to use multiple rounds with price feedback based on the premise that it could enhance the learning effect. 
7The number of people recruited for the second treatment was higher to set the final number of participants per ses-
sion the same for both treatments.
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Step 1. Subjects were asked to simultaneously sub-
mit a bid for each of the four lamb meat packages. 
The bids were collected and ranked from the highest 
to the lowest and the ID number of the top three bid-
ders and the 4th highest price for each of the products 
were posted on the board. 
Step 2. Step 1 was repeated for four additional 
rounds. 
Step 3. After all the rounds were conducted, a ran-
dom drawing determined which of the five rounds 
was binding.
Step 4. A random drawing determined which of 
the four lamb meat packages was binding.
Step 5. The top three bidders on the binding prod-
uct in the binding round had to purchase the lamb 
meat package and paid a price equivalent to the 4th 
highest bid for the product. 
RESULTS
Third and fourth columns in Table 1 report the 
descriptive statistics of the socio-demographic vari-
ables for treatment 1 and treatment 2. A total of 78 
subjects participated in treatment 1, whereas a total 
of 54 subjects participated in treatment 2. We used 
the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine if there are any 
significant differences in the socio-demographic vari-
ables across the two treatments. The results of the 
tests suggest that there are no statistically significant 
differences at the 5% level across the treatments by 
gender (p-value = 0.99), the household size (p-value = 
0.26), education (p-value = 0.92) and income (p-value 
= 0.93). Then, the socio-demographic characteristics 
for both samples are similar. 
The mean bids for the four lamb meat products by 
rounds for treatments 1 and 2 are exhibited in Table 2 
as well as the competitiveness index8. Our null hy-
pothesis (H0: BidsC = BidsLC ; H1: BidsC ≠ BidsLC) is 
not rejected for all the rounds and the four products, 
then the participants bids from both treatments are 
statistically equal. Moreover, as expected, the level of 
the participant competitiveness is statistically higher 
in treatment 1 than in treatment 2. Results from these 
two tests indicated that the level of the participants’ 
competitiveness does not affect their bidding behaviour 
because although the level of competitiveness is dif-
ferent (higher in the first treatment) across treatment, 
the participants bids for the products are the same. 
Nevertheless, to test our hypothesis after control-
ling for differences in the socio-demographic char-
acteristics and taking into account the panel nature 
Table 1. Definition and means of demographic variables
Variable definition Name (type) Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Testa
Number of participants 78 54
Gender
     male
     female 
FEMALE (dummy
1=female; 0 otherwise)
29.5
70.5
29.6
70.4
0.000
(0.988)
Age (years)
 
YEARS (continuous) 53.9 47.1 6.742
(0.009)**
Household size
 
HSIZE (continuous) 3.1 2.8 1.254
(0.262)
Education of respondent 
High School 
 
HIGHSCHOOL (dummy 1=high 
school; 0 otherwise) 26.9 25.9
0.009
(0.92)
Income
     high income
 
HINCOME (dummy 1=more than 
2,500 €; 0 otherwise) 26.9 27.8
0.007
(0.93)
athe Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test was calculated; * and ** denote statistically significant differences at 10% 
and 5%, respectively
8The Cronbach’ alpha coefficient for the competitiveness question was 0.8 similar to the one found by Brown et al. 
(1998) and higher than the recommended level of 0.7. Using the scores given to the four sentences, we calculated 
a competitiveness index for each participant as the sum of each subject’s responses to the 4 sentences. Hence, the 
competitiveness index is from 4 to 20.
9We had five round bids for each participant.
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of our data9, we modelled the elicited bids for the 
four lamb meat products as a function of the socio-
demographic variables, rounds and a Treatment2 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if subjects par-
ticipated in treatment 2 and 0 otherwise. The model 
specification is as follows: 
Bidsit = α + BXi + δ1round2 + δ2round3 + δ3round4+
               + δ4round5 + γTreatment2i + εit (2)
where Bidsit is the bid for the ith consumer in the tth 
bidding round, Xi is a vector of demographic control 
variables (defined in Table 1) and round2, round3, 
round4 and round5 are dummy variables for the dif-
ferent rounds. Finally, εit is the overall error term. 
We estimated the model defined by equation (2) 
using a panel random-effects to take into account 
individuals’ heterogeneity (Baltagi 2003). Estimated 
coefficients using the STATA are presented in Table 3. 
Because our panel data is a micro panel (with very 
few years and many individuals), we expected to have 
heteroskedasticity problems. However, although we 
did not expect the serial correlation, we test the au-
tocorrelation of first-order using the Wooldrigde test 
for the autocorrelation in the panel data (Wooldrigde 
2002; Drukker 2003). The associated p-values for the 
Wooldrigde test indicated that the null hypothesis of 
no first-order autocorrelation was rejected for the four 
estimated equations. Then, because of the presence 
of the heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we 
calculated the robust standard errors for disturbances 
being heteroscedastic and auto-correlated (Hoechle 
2007). The dummy variables for the rounds are posi-
tive and mostly statistically significant. However, the 
estimated coefficients suggest that the round effects 
are not monotonically increasing across rounds, ce-
teris paribus, but fluctuating around the mean which 
implies that there are minimal bid affiliation effects.
To test our hypothesis (H0: BidsC = BidsLC; H1: 
BidsC ≠ BidsLC), we used the t-ratio of the treatment 2 
variable. Because the estimated parameter for the 
treatment2 variable is not statistically significant for 
the four analysed products, we can conclude that the 
bids for the two treatments are the same, corrobo-
rating our previous results using the Kruskal-Wallis 
test (Table 2). 
Table 2. Mean bids for each lamb meat product in treatment 1 and treatment 2 by rounds and the mean com-
petitiveness index
Bids Competitiveness i ndex 
round1 round2 round3 round4 round5 mean mean
Lamb
Treatment1 2.11 2.18 2.18 2.15 2.21 2.17 11.12
Treatment2 2.03 2.15 2.18 2.25 2.31 2.18 9.65
Test (χ2, p-value)a 0.024(0.88)
0.102
(0.75)
0.085
(0.77)
0.091
(0.76)
0.199
(0.65)
0.028
(0.87)
5.95
(0.01)**
Suckling lamb
Treatment1 2.71 2.85 2.78 2.78 2.86 2.80 11.12
Treatment2 2.61 2.83 2.77 2.73 2.83 2.75 9.65
Test (χ2, p-value)a 0.187(0.66)
0.199
(0.65)
0.054
(0.82)
0.022
(0.88)
0.058
(0.81)
0.002
(0.96)
5.95
(0.01)**
Lamb labelled as “Ojinegra from Teruel”
Treatment1 2.49 2.68 2.60 2.69 2.71 2.63 11.12
Treatment2 2.40 2.55 2.56 2.56 2.60 2.53 9.65
Test (χ2, p-value)a 0.248(0.62)
0.015
(0.90)
0.004
(0.95)
0.130
(0.72)
0.009
(0.93)
0.114
(0.73)
5.95
(0.01)**
Suckling lamb labelled as “Ojinegra from Teruel”
Treatment1 2.94 3.13 3.07 3.10 3.14 3.08 11.12
Treatment2 2.97 3.18 3.05 3.05 3.11 3.07 9.65
Test (χ2, p-value)a 0.000(0.98)
0.482
(0.48)
0.155
(0.69)
0.043
(0.83)
0.164
(0.68)
0.232
(0.63)
5.95
(0.01)**
athe Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test was calculated; * and ** denote statistically significant differences at 10% and 
5%, respectively
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Hence, our findings indicated that the level of the 
participants’ competitiveness does not affect their 
bidding behaviour for the four lamb meat products 
and, therefore, the participants’ valuation for the 
products is independent of the level of the partici-
pants’ competitiveness. In other words, if we instruct 
participants that it is in their best interest to offer 
a bid equal to their true value, the level of the par-
ticipants’ competitiveness does not affect the bids 
they offer for the auctioned product using the non-
hypothetical experimental auctions. Then, valuation 
for food products are the same for the competitive 
and less competitive participants. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The increasing popularity of the experimental auc-
tions to value new products or attributes is due to 
their theoretical economic incentive compatibility 
property. In other words, the participants had the 
incentive to truly bid for the auctioned product. 
However, the participants with a higher level of 
competitiveness may offer higher bids because they 
gain an additional utility from winning the auction 
that could drive the level of the participants’ com-
petitiveness does affect their bids for the products 
being valued. 
Our experiment consisted of two treatments with 
all the same designed characteristics except that in 
the second treatment, participants who reported 
higher levels of competitiveness were not allowed to 
participate in the auction. Then, we could directly 
compare the bids from both treatments to test the 
differences in bids between them. Our results showed 
that the bids from both treatments (higher competi-
tiveness and lower competitiveness) are statistically 
similar. Then, our key finding is that the level of the 
participants’ competitiveness does not affect the 
bidding behaviour and then, the valuations obtained 
from the experimental auctions are the same regard-
less of the level of the participants’ competitiveness. 
Table 3. Random-effect models for the four lamb meat products
Variables Lamb Suckling lamb Labelled lamb Labelled suckling 
Constant 2.0244(3.93)**
2.1020
(3.54)**
2.6548
(4.55)**
2.1856
(3.32)**
Female 0.4999(2.74)**
0.8805
(4.05)**
0.6828
(3.36)**
0.9722
(3.94)**
Age –0.0028(–0.47)
0.0008
(0.11)
–0.0088
(–1.34)
0.0001
(0.02)
Hsize –0.0700(–1.00)
–0.0604
(–0.65)
–0.0532
(–0.62)
0.0018
(0.02)
Highschool –0.0015(–0.01)
–0.0101
(–0.04)
–0.1074
(–0.50)
–0.0262
(–0.10)
Hincome 0.2279(1.22)
0.4121
(1.87)*
0.1005
(0.49)
0.3018
(1.20)
Round2 0.0870(1.72)*
0.1697
(2.88)**
0.1735
(2.85)**
0.1996
(2.66)**
Round3 0.0995(1.75)*
0.1048
(1.45)*
0.1312
(1.91)**
0.1122
(1.48)
Round4 0.1156(1.96)**
0.0905
(1.02)
0.1839
(2.53)**
0.1293
(1.49)
Round5 0.1746(2.80)**
0.1807
(2.01)**
0.2155
(2.90)**
0.1748
(1.93)**
Treatment2 –0.0223(–0.14)
–0.0562
(–0.26)
–0.1735
(–0.93)
–0.0110
(–0.05)
N 660 660 660 660
χ2
 p-value
20.15
(0.03)**
39.29
(0.00)**
26.86
(0.00)**
35.54
(0.00)**
Wooldrige test
 p-value
78.20
0.000
29.06
0.000
7.28
0.008
23.27
0.000
* and ** denote statistically significant differences at 10% and 5%, respectively; z-ratios are in parenthesis (calculated 
using the robust standard errors to disturbances being heteroscedastic and auto-correlated (Hoechle2007)).
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Our contribution to the literature and to the practi-
tioners working with experimental auctions to value 
food products is that, if we use the non-hypothetical 
auctions and make sure that the participants are 
instructed that it is in their best interest to offer a 
bid equal to their true, then the valuations obtained 
for products are independent on the level of the 
participants’ competitiveness. 
One possible criticism of our study is that we used 
a self-reported measure of the participants competi-
tiveness and a further research is still needed using 
some objective indicator. However, the question used 
had been also applied in several empirical papers and 
the validity of the competitiveness scale in our case 
was high. A further research should be undertaken 
using other type of experimental auctions, other 
products and in other geographical settings to cor-
roborate our finding. 
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